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EFFECTIvENESS OF THE POLISH, 
DANISH AND CYPRIOT PRESIDENCIES 
IN THE FIELD OF ENLARGEMENT POLICY – 
‘A PROJECT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIvE’
This article concerns the evaluation of the Polish, Danish and Cypriot presi-
dencies in the field of the European Union enlargement policy. In order to as-
sess an effectiveness of both countries he uses a project assessment perspective, 
which theoretical model was initially developed in the book Skuteczność pol skiej 
prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej (trans.: The effectiveness of the Polish presidency 
in the European Union). A thesis standing behind this approach says that after 
the treaty of Lisbon has come into force, and has changed crucial functions of 
each presidency, we can’t any more consider a country chairing the Council nei-
ther as honest broker nor as representative of own national interests. A project 
assessment perspective delivers more adequate categories based on project man-
agement theory and practice. In the empirical part of the study the author focus-
es on the effects of Polish, Danish and Cypriot activities in the field of relations 
with six candidate countries since 1 July 2011 till 31 December 2012.
Polish presidency 2011, Danish presidency 2012, project assessment of the pres-
idency, effectiveness, EU enlargement policy
INTRODUCTION
In second half of the year 2011 Poland for the first time in its European Union mem-
bership history chaired the meetings of the Council of the European Union (later: the 
Council). Thus, it seems desirable to reliably evaluate the effectiveness of this country 
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presidency in the context of activities undertaken by Denmark and Cyprus – other 
countries from the trio presidency, which has finished its term on 31 December 2012.
Group presidency, or trio as it is sometimes called, was formally enclosed in the 
primary law of the European Union (later: the EU) by the Treaty of Lisbon amending 
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(later: treaty of Lisbon) which entered into force on 1 December 2009. The trio presi-
dency in the Council supposes to provide the continuity of legislative process in the 
Council and should also guarantees more cohesion of plans and activities undertaken 
by each country from a group presidency.
Those circumstances inter alia cause, that presidency is required, as one of the in-
stitution of the system of the EU, to provide a positive response to the effects of crises 
happening in the frame of this system. We can mention at least three the most vis-
ible crises that affects the balance of the system of the EU. First, is a crisis of eurozone, 
which manifests itself through the problems of refinancing of a government debts in 
the southern countries of the UE1. Second, is a Schengen zone crisis. It reached its peak 
during the civil war in Libya in 2011, when uncontrolled stream of immigrants tried to 
force their way to the territory of the EU. Some member states like France or Germany 
suggested to return control at the internal borders, implying in this way that they didn’t 
trust a security mechanisms of other members states. Third crisis considers lack of clear 
leadership in the EU. The EU institutions, which hardly handle to manage eurozone 
crisis, are substituted by more effective activity of the biggest and economically more 
efficient member states.
Bearing in mind above factors it is important for political scientists to analyze the 
effectiveness of the Polish presidency activity, as well as other presidencies from trio, 
and how they affected a functioning of the system of the EU. It is also relevant for 
decision makers in Poland to focus on the ex post evaluation in order to gain reliable 
feedback what was done wrong or good during the programming and conducting the 
presidency.
In Poland theoretical consideration in this matter so far paid attention mainly to in-
stitutional arrangements of the presidency under the treaty of Lisbon and conclusions 
for the Polish presidency drawn from the experience of countries previously holding 
this post2. Other areas of research concentrated on preparation of Polish administra-
1 K. Szczerski, ‘Polska prezydencja a europejski kryzys’ in idem (ed.), Monitor polskiej prezydencji 2011. 
Raport zamknięcia, Kraków 2011, pp. 11 -14. In this book K. Szczerski distinguishes broader scope of 
crises influencing the EU, i.e. crisis of the borders, crisis of the institutions, crisis of the security, crisis 
of the Euro currency, crisis of a social model and crisis of a development model.
2 K. Szczerski (ed.), Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Analizy i doświadczenia, Kraków 2009; A. Nowak-
-Far (ed.), Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Instytucje, prawo i organizacja, Warszawa 2010; Z. Czachór, 
M.J. Tomaszyk (eds.), Przewodnictwo państwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Doświadczenia partnerów, 
propozycje dla Polski, Poznań 2009; K.A. Wojtaszczyk (ed.), Prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej, 
Warszawa 2010; J. Barcz, Prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Podstawy prawne i ramy instytucjo-
nalne wraz z podstawowymi dokumentami, Warszawa 2010; L. Jesień, Prezydencja Unii Europejskiej. 
Zinstytucjonalizowana procedura przywództwa politycznego, Warszawa 2011; T. Husak, F. Jasiński 
(eds.), Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Perspektywa praktyczna, Warszawa 2010.
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tion to holding the presidency and on government priorities, which were supposed to 
fulfill during the six month period3. Topic of the Polish presidency was also analyzed 
by think -tanks and research centers4. Thus, there is a visible gap in ex post evaluation of 
the Polish presidency, which only a few publications try to fill5. So far there are also no 
attempts to assess effects of the other than Polish presidencies in the broader context of 
ambitions and plans of trio presidency institution.
The aim of this article is to examine the effectiveness of the Polish presidency against 
the Danish and Cyprus presidency in the field of enlargement policy. Corresponding 
to such formulated aim I will answer to the research questions considering, firstly, how 
far the enlargement process has moved forward since July 2011 till December 2012. 
Secondly, has Poland and rest of the trio presidencies fulfilled their objectives in the 
field of enlargement? Thirdly, what were the types of the objectives in the analyzing 
policy field and in what way have they influenced the character of the Polish presidency 
and other trio country’s activity.
A methodology used in this article is based on the project assessment model pro-
posed in the work titled Skuteczność polskiej prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej (trans.: 
The effectiveness of the Polish presidency in the European Union), which was prepared 
by a research team, led by Krzysztof Szczerski since November 2011 till June 2012. 
A theoretical description of the project assessment presented in first and second sec-
tion of the article are also based on a conception initially described in the mentioned 
book6.
3 Z. Czachór, T.R. Szymczyński (eds.), Priorytety prezydencji Polski w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Analiza 
politologiczna, Warszawa 2011, Studia Europejskie – Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN; A. Nowak-
-Far (ed.), Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Polska 2011, Warszawa 2011; Prezydencja Polski w Unii 
Europejskiej 2011 r. Materiały przygotowane przez Departament Analiz i Strategii, Warszawa 2009, 
Biuletyn Analiz Urzędu komitetu Integracji Europejskiej, No. 22.
4 M. Brachowicz (ed.), Wyzwania polskiej prezydencji 2011, Kraków 2010; K. Szpak (ed.), Monitor 
Polskiej Prezydencji 2011 r. Raport otwarcia, Kraków 2011; K. Szczerski (ed.), Monitor Polskiej 
Prezydencji 2011. Raport zamknięcia; P.M. Kaczyński, Polish Council Presidency 2011. Ambitions and 
Limitations, Stockholm 2011.
5 C. Żołędowski (ed.), Polska prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Wybrane zagadnienia w perspek-
tywie politologicznej i medialnej, Warszawa 2012; A. Legucka (ed.), Polska prezydencja wobec wyzwań 
współczesnej Unii Europejskiej, Warszawa 2012; conference materials from the National School of 
Public Administration: J. Czaputowicz, Z. Czachór (eds.), Prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. 
Bilans polskich doświadczeń. Materiały z konferencji, kSAP, 11 stycznia 2012 r., Warszawa 2012; 
B. Nowak, ‘Ostatnia prezydencja dużych oczekiwań. Refleksje po Prezydencji Polski w Radzie UE’, 
Raporty i Analizy Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych, No. 2 (2012), at <http://csm.org.pl/file-
admin/files/Biblioteka_CSM/Raporty_i_analizy/2012/Raporty_i_Analizy_2_2012_B_Nowak__
Ostatnia_prezydencja_.pdf>, 20 September 2012.
6 An author of this article is a co -author of three theoretical chapters presenting the project assessment 
perspective. Research team, operating in the Klub Jagielloński in Kraków and led by the Krzysztof 
Szczerski since December 2011 till April 2012, analyzed the performance of the Polish presidency on 
the basis of ministerial objectives accomplishment. A theoretical framework of assessment was provid-
ed by the project assessment perspective, which is an original input to the debate on Polish presiden-
cy. Effects of a research are presented in the book: K. Szczerski (ed.), Skuteczność polskiej prezydencji 
w Unii Europejskiej. Założone cele i ich realizacja, Kraków 2012, Societas, 52.
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Structure of this article will correspond with research questions asked above. In the 
first section I will give arguments for project assessment of the presidency’s effective-
ness and show its difference from other assessment perspectives, which completes oth-
ers rooted already in literature. Second section, will describe the criteria of a project 
assessment of the presidency. Third section will consist of analysis of the outcome of 
Polish, Danish and Cypriot presidency in the field of enlargement policy, using the 
project assessment perspective. At the end I will conclude the answers given to the re-
search questions.
1. DIFFERENT ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIvES7
Hitherto an ex post evaluation of the presidencies, presented in political studies was 
based on behavioural description of country chairing the Council. Usually this referred 
to the situation, when country holding a presidency could have been honest broker, i.e. 
impartial mediator between different preferences of EU actors, or representative of own 
national interests. Sometimes a country can be also assess by emphasising its organiza-
tional or leadership role8. Nevertheless, those categories may be reduced to fulfilling the 
role of neutral actor or role of actor who wants to influence the system according to its 
vision and usually national preferences. This article is dealing with a thesis, that changes 
introduced by treaty of Lisbon, concerning the position and role of the presidency in the 
system of the EU, incline to base a presidency’s evaluation on different categories.
Above dualistic description of presidency’s evaluation is very persuasive for political 
scientists and journalists because it uses clear assessment categories. Using presidency as 
an instrument of a given country’s foreign policy, forcing often own national interest or 
acting as mediator, taking care to achieve the broadest possible consensus – those cat-
egories are taken into consideration in other, already known in literature, schemes for 
analyzing the presidency9. We can distinguish at least four more types for assessment of 
the presidency, which completes traditional models:
a) public assessment,
7 The content of this section is based on: M. Dulak, K. Szczerski, ‘Ocena prezydencji. Podstawowe 
wyznaczniki pojęciowe’ in K. Szczerski (ed.), Skuteczność polskiej prezydencji…
8 See: A. Schout, ‘The Presidency as Juggler. Managing Conflicting Expectations’, EIPAscope, No. 2 
(1998), pp. 2 -10; A. Schout, S. Vanhoonacker, ‘Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU. 
Revisiting Nice’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 5 (2006), pp. 1051 -1077, at <http://
dx.doi.org/10.1017/50020818300027697>..
9 J.J. Węc, ‘Formalne i nieformalne możliwości oddziaływania prezydencji na funkcjonowanie Unii 
Europejskiej po zmianach przewidywanych w traktacie lizbońskim’ in K. Szczerski (ed.), Prezydencja 
w Unii…, pp. 31 -56; T.G. Grosse, ‘Doświadczenia prezydencji jako wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki’ in 
K. Szczerski (ed.), Prezydencja w Unii…, pp. 89 -106; Ł. Łotocki, ‘Promocja naiwności – o prezydencji 
w perspektywie społecznej’ in C. Żołędowski (ed.), Polska prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej…, 
pp. 137 -155; A. Jaskiernia, ‘Od awanturnika do wzorowego ucznia. Obraz polskiej prezydencji 
w Radzie Unii Europejskiej w mediach europejskich i polskich’ in C. Żołędowski (ed.), Polska prezy-
dencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej…, pp. 157 -175.
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b) political assessment,
c) system assessment,
d) project assessment.
First three types in their analytical and semantic layer, as we will see, are based on
the categories proposed by the honest broker – national interests’ representative model. 
Fourth one, which will be described in the next section of this article, shows broader 
catalogue of presidency’s evaluation regarding a character of accomplishing objectives.
A period of presidency usually attracts more public attention than other country ac-
tivities in the EU. Especially this event is very popular in the countries, which for the first 
time hold a presidency post. A public assessment is expressed through the public opin-
ion surveys, but the most often way of getting to know the opinion of a society of a given 
country on presidency are information media. Because the issues concerning the presi-
dency and the EU are relatively complicated, views presented by the opinion leaders in 
newspapers, TV and the Internet can be accepted as reliable sources of information.
An example for public assessment is a survey made in January 2012, by one of the 
Polish public opinion’s research centre. According to it Poles assessed its presidency 
rather negative10. An activity of a government during that time was negatively rated by 
45% respondents. More than half of people asked in the survey (53%) stated also that 
Poland didn’t achieve very much during the presidency. Nevertheless, according to 63% 
of responded Poles think, that chairing the Council helped to improve country’s image 
in Europe and around the world. This last result corresponded with positive opinions 
of the European politicians, often cited by Polish press, who mentioned such successes 
of Polish presidency like signing accession treaty with Croatia or approving a “six -pack” 
legislation11. In Denmark a period of presidency didn’t attract so much public attention 
as it was in the case of Poland, as since joining the EU in 1973 it was the seventh presi-
dency held by this country.. However, opinions of the leaders of social and professional 
groups, presented in Danish press, named the presidency as “pragmatic in historical 
time”12. They regretted at the same time, that government could have focused more on 
climate and energy issues and free -trade agreements.
As “pragmatic” Danish presidency was also assessed by the members of the European 
Parliament (EP) during the debate on review of the presidency presented by Danish 
10 Survey was carried by the Public Opinion Research Centre (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej – 
CBOS) in January 2012 on a sample of 1058 people. See: ‘Evaluation of Polish Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union’, at <http://www.cbos.pl/EN/publications/reports/2012/011_12.
pdf>, 15 September 2012.
11 ‘Co zostanie z polskiej prezydencji’, Gazeta Wyborcza, 29 December 2011, at <http://wyborcza.pl/pre-
zydencja2011/1,111636,10884081,Co_zostanie_z_polskiej_prezydencji.html>, 15 September 2012; 
P. Jendroszczyk, ‘Polacy okazali się bezbłędni’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 December 2011, at <http://www.
rp.pl/artykul/107684,769931 -Polacy -okazali -sie -bezbledni.html>, 15 September 2012; ‘Barosso: 
polska prezydencja spełniła nasze oczekiwania’, Rzeczpospolita, 14 December 2011, at <http://www.
rp.pl/artykul/603964,769564 -Barroso–Polska -prezydencja -spelnila -nasze -oczekiwania.html>,
15 Sep tember 2012.
12 ‘Danes: Our EU Presidency Was a Solid Lunch’, Euractiv.com, 28 June 2012, at <http://www.euractiv.
com/future -eu/danes -eu -presidency -solid -lunch -news -513590>, 18 September 2012.
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prime minister13. This traditional point in the agenda of the EP plenary session at the 
end of each presidency is one of the elements of political assessment. Most of all such 
evaluation is made in debate between government and opposition in a given country. 
A forum for this debate is one of the chambers of a national parliament. Rules of this 
assessments are set by legal acts defining the cooperation of government and parliament 
in issues concerning European affairs14.
Third type of presidency assessment refers to the role played and position possessed 
by the country holding the presidency in the institutional system of the EU. The way 
and efficiency of performing presidency’s tasks results from the formal and legal rules 
of the EU system, but also from its political nature. The latter factor is based on the be-
lieve that member states possess a structural power and related instruments of influence. 
According to J. Tallberg a given country bases its structural power on such capabilities 
and resources as economic strength, size, population, political stability, military and ad-
ministrative capabilities15. The bigger structural power is, the broader scope for using 
informal and formal instruments has a given country. Usually bigger states more often 
are able to force their interests in projected legislative. Such countries easier form alli-
ances with other member states and can deal with more issues defined in the European 
Commission’s legislative agenda. Thus, the efficiency of presidency is assessed whether 
the country has included in presidency’s program the issues important for the whole 
European community, which are simultaneously convergent with preferences and na-
tional interest of a given country16.
Second factor of a system assessment refers to legal framework for presidency’s role 
in the institutional system of the EU, which is settled by the treaty of Lisbon’s provisions 
and internal regulations of the Council17. Those documents design the formal scope of 
13 ‘Review of the Danish Presidency (Debate)’, 3 July 2012, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef= -//EP//TEXT+CRE+20120703+ITEM -004+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, 30 
September 2012; ‘Praise – and Some Blade – for the Outgoing Danish Presidency’, Press release of 
the European Parliament, 3 July 2012, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/pl/pressroom/
content/20120629IPR47966/html/Praise -and -some -blame -for -the -outgoing -Danish -Presidency>, 
30 September 2012.
14 ‘Informacja bieżąca w sprawie podsumowania polskiej prezydencji w Radzie Unii Europejskiej w cza-
sie 5. posiedzenia Sejmu VII kadencji’, 12 January 2012, at <http://www.sejm.gov.pl/Sejm7.nsf/wy-
powiedz.xsp?posiedzenie=5&dzien=2&wyp=43>, 30 September 2012.
15 J. Tallberg, ‘Bargaining Power in the European Council’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 46, 
No. 3 (2008), p. 687, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1408-5965.2008.00798.x>.
16 T.G. Grosse, ‘Doświadczenia prezydencji jako wyzwanie dla polskiej polityki’, pp. 89 -106.
17 Article 16 section 9 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Official Journal of 
the European Union, 30 March 2010, C 83/13; Declaration on Article 16(9) of the Treaty on European 
Union Concerning the European Council Decision on the Exercise of the Presidency of the Council Annexed 
to the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference which adopted the Treaty of Lisbon, Official Journal 
of the European Union, 30 March 2010, C 83/335; European Council Decision of 1 December 2009 on 
the Exercise of the Presidency of the Council (2009/881/EU), Official Journal of the European Union, 
2 December 2009, L 315/50; Council Decision of 1 December 2009 Adopting the Council’s Rules of 
Procedure (2009/937/EU), Official Journal of the European Union, 11 December 2009, L 325/35 -61 
(articles 20 and 21).
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actions for the presidency and define possible instruments, which country chairing the 
Council’s bodies can use. Basically, we can distinguish five functions, which every pres-
idency ought to fulfill. Those are mediating, administrative, planning, coordination 
and representative functions18.
A task of the presidency according to first function is being active on each stage of 
negotiation processes in order to mediate for preparing and finally reaching the com-
promise in disputed questions. Eventually, the role of the presidency is to develop and 
propose a position covering the issues raised by the widest number of actors taking part 
in negotiations. For an efficiently fulfilling this function it is important for a member 
state holding the presidency to obey the neutrality rule.
According to the administrative function country holding the presidency should 
firstly prepare half -year working calendar of the Council i.e. different Council forma-
tion, COREPER I and II and working parties. Secondly, presidency has to also provide 
all necessary working papers to the delegations of member states during the meetings 
in the Council’s bodies.
After treaty of Lisbon has come into force, the long term programming is right now 
in the hands of the European Council, chaired by its permanent President. Main task of 
the presidency, while fulfilling planning function, has been limited to operational pro-
gramming, which means that country holding this post is especially obliged to prepare 
18 -months program of trio and program of actions for a half year period. In order to 
make those programs more accountable, the objectives and priorities set in mentioned 
documents should be clearly defined and put in hierarchical order. The role of trio pro-
gram is also to provide visible continuity between programs of different presidencies.
Country holding the presidency should also assure an efficient coordination of 
work within the Council. Fourth function obliges the presidency to guarantee an effi-
cient cooperation between the Council and other EU institutions. This especially ap-
plies to the presidency taking part in the name of the Council in legislative activities 
in the forum of informal trialogue and Conciliation Committee19. This task is also an 
aspect of inter -institutional representation to which the presidency is obliged as well.
18 A terminology distinguished in: J.J. Węc, ‘Formalne i nieformalne możliwości…’, pp. 35 -50. In my 
further consideration I am going to use this classification because of its clarity and providing a com-
prehensive framework of performing of all Presidency’s obligation derived from the treaty of Lisbon. 
Other, more expanded catalogues of functions proposed in the literature propose additional deta-
iled functions, which, however, are derived from the distinction presented by J.J. Węc. See: J. Barcz, 
Prezydencja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej…, pp. 45 -56, where J. Barcz points at management function, 
planning function, mediating, function of co -operation with other EU institutions and external re-
presentation function. Additionally J. Barcz singles out symbolic function and function handled while 
negotiating of revision treaties; Another often mentioned distinction is the one proposed by Artur 
Nowak -Far, who writes about eight functions: stimulation of integration system, management and re-
gulation, innovation and missionary, programming and operationalization, representation, mediations 
and negotiations, adaptation, implementation (i.e. unification and harmonization); see. A. Nowak -Far 
(ed.), Prezydencja w Unii Europejskiej. Instytucje…, pp. 220 -224.
19 An assembly comprising of the members of the Council (or their representatives) and an equal num-
ber of representatives of the EP. It gathers just after the Council rejects amendments of the EP to the 
legislative proposal submitted in the second reading in ordinary legislative procedure (article 294 sec-
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In the case of representative function we can distinguish two aspects. First one is in-
ternal representation, which concerns the relations with other member states, intergov-
ernmental and supranational EU institutions and a presentation of the EU initiatives 
to the public opinion. The presidency should be also visible during the meetings of the 
European Council without detriment to the functions and obligations of other bod-
ies like the President of the European Council. Second aspect of representative func-
tion is an external representation. After the treaty of Lisbon came into force it is High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who has a leading 
role in this field.
As we can see, the competencies of the institution of a presidency significant-
ly changed under the new treaty. They were diminished by creation of the perma-
nent President of the European Council and new institutional position of the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Also new organi-
zation of performance framework for the presidency, i.e. a group presidency of three 
member states, has affected the role and position of the presidencies. As a consequence 
of these changes coordination, planning and representative functions were limited, 
as well as the instruments subscribed to them, which favored the presidency to play 
a role of the national interests’ representative. Thus, the thesis of inadequacy of dualistic 
model of the presidency’s assessment seems justified.
The mediating and administrative functions’ instruments tend to describe presi-
dency as an efficient operations manager – using a corporate language – that is re-
sponsible for implementing a particular strategy or plan, but can’t be any longer de-
scribed as a chair of the board. The aftermath of this transformations is a believe that 
adequate instruments for evaluating the presidency provide the project assessment 
perspective.
2. PRESIDENCY AS A PROJECT20
In order to better understand a convergence between technocratic presidency and 
a project, which is in fact an instrument of technocracy, it is helpful at the beginning 
to show similarities between presidency and basic categories of project management 
methods. This will let us clearly to present the categories of presidency’s assessment in 
this perspective. Firstly, description of a project is convergent to the role of the presi-
dency. In literature, a project is defined as an activity:
– aimed at accomplishing of objectives;
– involving to this task many actors, arranged in specific organizational structure
(in case of presidency this concerns especially a national administration);
tion 8 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). Representative of the presidency (for 
example a minister responsible for a given issue) is a co -chairman of the Coordination Committee.
20 The content of this section is based on second chapter from the book Skuteczność polskiej prezydencji 
w Unii Europejskiej: M. Dulak, K. Szczerski, ‘Prezydencja jako projekt’ in K. Szczerski (ed.), Skuteczność 
polskiej prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej.
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– characterized by definite beginning and end;
– different from routine procedures of a given organization (in case of presidency:
the procedures of national administration);
– characterized by unrepeatability (country holds presidency once every several
years)21.
Secondly, in the case of both – presidency and project – we can distinguish three 
stages of realization: planning, implementation and evaluation. First one concerns an 
objectives’ programming, preparing the human, administrative and financial resources. 
In the second stage, an ongoing monitoring reviews how objectives and processes are 
put into practice. During the last phase, evaluators assess ex post whether planning and 
implementation were correct and measure also what is the level of achieved objectives 
and indicators.
Thirdly, presidency similarly to the project is obliged to achieve material or non-
-material results. The rule of accountability concerns a measurement of undertaken ac-
tions using performance and outcome indicators. However, it is practically impossible, 
in the case of presidency seen as a project, to define second type of indicators according 
to the correct methodology. First of all, presidency doesn’t have particularly indicated 
subject of intervention, but its activity is aimed generally at all institutions and actors 
functioning within the system of the EU. Just the opposite is in the case of public poli-
cies, where project approach is commonly used and where the subjects of public inter-
vention are specific social groups. A barrier for a proper measurement of outcome indi-
cators is also a short period of chairing the Council. An impact of a public intervention 
is visible in longer period of time. The presidency, according to the available functions, 
tackles with current issues, which are elements of longer processes and polices of the 
EU. Thus, six, twelve or even eighteen months are not enough to measure the effects of 
presidency activities in line with the outcome indicators.
Theoretically, it is possible to define performance indicators, because they show 
the material effects of presidency work, i.e. adopted legal acts, signed agreements etc. 
However, this way of evaluation won’t present the whole spectrum of presidency’s in-
fluence, which has also a political nature. Additionally, a selection of one performance 
indicator can be easily undermined by accusation of favoring either the thesis of presi-
dency’s success or presidency’s failure. In order to avoid problematic elements of tradi-
tional indicators, but not to violate the rule of accountability, the adequate benchmarks 
for the presidency’s effects assessment refer to the nature of presidency’s objectives.
According to the presidency’s evaluation model, proposed in the previously men-
tioned book Skuteczność polskiej prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej, presidency understood 
21 The most common definitions of a project, prepared by the leading institutions in project manage-
ment, point at its temporal and purposefulness character: A Guide to the Project Management Body of 
knowledge. PMBOk Guide, Project Management Institute Inc., 2004, pp. 5 -6; Aid Delivery Methods, 
Vol. 1: Project Cycle Management Guidelines, European Commission, March 2004, pp. 8 -9. Definition 
presented in the article, beside temporal and purposefulness, includes also an administration and or-
ganizational aspect of every project, which in my opinion properly corresponds with the character of 
presidency: M. Pawlak, Podstawy zarządzania projektami, Lublin 2001, pp. 7 -9.
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as a project can be assessed by description of objectives’ character. Analyzing their con-
tent and the way of planning we can assess the ambitions and plans of a country con-
cerning how should look the role of the presidency. We can distinguish three pairs of 
categories describing the character of the objectives:
a) innovative objective / continuity objective,
b) firm objective / soft objective,
c) agreed objective / individual objective.
First pair refers to the content of the objectives. It describes whether presidency
decides to put on the agenda an issue, which hasn’t been previously raised by other 
presidencies, or hasn’t been on the presidencies agenda for a long time. Those objec-
tives relates also to the situation, when presidency proposes a new, unconvention-
al way of dealing with a given subject. Continuity objective on the contrary refers to 
those matters, chosen by the presidency, which carry on current processes and initia-
tives. According to the available functions, which presidency has to its disposal, sec-
ond type of these objectives will probably gain the majority in presidency’s programme. 
Nevertheless, a share of innovative objectives points at ambitions of a country chair-
ing the Council to shape the European policies according to its ideas and conceptions. 
Otherwise, a country wants to present itself as a supervisor of the administration proc-
ess during the six months.
Second pair of objectives’ character refers to the predictable results of a given ob-
jective. In the case of a firm objective the presidency expects to conclude documents, 
which legally bind actors in the system of the EU. The examples of such documents are 
a secondary legislation acts, bi- and multilateral agreements, compromises reached in 
the Council over particular policy issue, but also reports, conference’s conclusions and 
sui generis legislation (resolutions, guidelines, etc.), which formally don’t bind members 
states. Other examples of firm objectives are those initiatives, which result in introduc-
ing a new mechanism or institution within one of the European policies or initiation 
of the formal or informal meeting of a new body, for example at the margin of the dif-
ferent Council’s formations meeting. A presidency pursuing such objectives has an am-
bition to leave possibly many of such permanent traces. Their importance, however, 
can be measured only if following presidencies will often refer to the material results of 
their predecessors.
Third type of objectives is in fact a reformulate distinction on national and European 
objectives. It is, however, adapted to the formal obligation of cooperation between 
countries within one trio, and to the project management perspective, where rule of 
cooperation is one of the determinants of a successful project. In a highly complicated 
structure of mutual relations inside the system of the EU, a single country is hardly able 
to force its own idea and proposals. Thus, the presidency tries to gain a support of other 
member states or institutions for a particular issue either at the planning or implement-
ing phase. Among the methods of getting a support are forming the alliances inside 
the Council; earning a goodwill of an important institutions in the legislative process, 
i.e. European Commission and European Parliament; initiating a less formal lobbying
groups, like friends of the presidency. This means that objectives, for which presidency
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tries to gain an interest, are more important for a country chairing the Council than 
other, chosen without consultations.
Finally, in efforts of analyzing the presidency we have to take into considerations the 
political nature of every presidency. This opinion is based on the conception of realism, 
according to which within integration process only states dispose its sovereignty. States 
are not altruists and the only reason they transfer some elements of their power to the 
supranational level is confidence that benefits will outweigh the costs of uncertainty 
and costs of a relations between many actors within the system22. Thus, when evalu-
ating the presidency we should also take into account a fact that country chairing the 
Council will try to realize its own national interest. A role of a researcher is to propose 
adequate assessment categories for this phenomenon.
The thesis stating that after the changes introduced by the treaty of Lisbon we can’t 
assess the presidency according to the dualistic model not only implies the project as-
sessment perspective, proposed in this article, but also influence the country’s role as 
a national interest’s representative. Limitation of the coordination, planning and rep-
resentative functions deprive the presidency of an open methods of pushing for own 
interests. Right now country holding the presidency should be a “silent national in-
terest’s representative”. The aim of the article is to assess the Polish and Danish presi-
dencies activity in the field of enlargement policy only according to the project assess-
ment perspective without focusing on the political aspect of evaluation. Thus, I will 
briefly note what instruments has a presidency to its disposal in order to gently realize 
its own national interest23. Among the catalogue of possible actions undertaken by the 
presidency, first one refers to the duty of arranging the working agenda and meetings 
of the Council’s bodies under the administrative function. According to the Swedish 
political scientist Jonas Tallberg, although the presidency is characterized by ‘respon-
sabilité sans pouvoir’ (responsibility without power), it can effectively push its inter-
ests by influencing a shape of the agenda of the Council. The possible scope of action 
concerns agenda -setting, agenda -structuring and agenda exclusion24. Despite the fact 
that J. Tallberg proposed those instruments for the institutional reality before the trea-
ty of Lisbon came into force, most of the solutions are still adequate for the working 
methods in the Council’s committees and working parties. Other possible actions for 
a presidency to act as a “silent national interest’s representative” are those referring to 
the ability of a country to form a coalitions. Some aspects of possible methods of build-
22 R.D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics. The Logic of Two -Level Games’, 
International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 427 -460, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ 
50020818300027697>; A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community. A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1993), pp. 473-
-524, at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1408-5965.2008.00798.x>.
23 More detailed description of the instruments of a presidency understood as “silent national interest’s 
representative” are enclosed also in the work titled Skuteczność polskiej prezydencji w Unii Europejskiej 
edited by K. Szczerski. A presidency’s evaluation by using the categories of a “silent national interest’s 
representative” completes the project assessment perspective but can be also analyzed separately.
24 J. Tallberg, ‘An Agenda -Shaping Powers of the EU Council Presidencies’, Journal of European Public 
Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2003), pp. 2 -4.
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ing alliance was mentioned, while describing the character of objectives. What com-
pletes this technique is the rank of the given country’s representatives involved in the 
coalition building. The higher the official or politician in the government is, the more 
respect is shown to his or her proposal of alliances. In order to achieve expected results, 
the presidency can use one of the negotiation method, for example tour des capitals i.e. 
visiting the capitals of given countries25.
3. EvALUATION OF THE PRESIDENCIES’ ACTIvITIES 
IN THE FIELD OF ENLARGEMENT
A methodology I used, while studying the performance of the Polish and Danish 
presidencies was based mainly on analysis of documents of the Council, European 
Commission and the European Council. First of all, I have taken into consideration 
the conclusions of European Council and General Affairs Council; electronically avail-
able documents of the Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating 
Accession to the EU; schedules of meeting of the Working Parties, COREPER I and 
II and documents of the presidency send to the European Parliament and European 
Commission. I have also analyzed European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy and 
Progress Reports from 2010 and 2011 and Commission’s opinions on the country’s 
application for accession to the EU, as a complementary documents in the field of en-
largement policy.
Besides the EU documents I also have analyzed government documents of each trio 
countries concerning the presidency and interviews with government’s officials. These 
were helpful in putting the performance of the presidency into context of its priorities 
and national administration’s preparation for holding the post. An additional source of 
information were press releases of the Council and articles in the thematic web pages 
concerning the EU affairs.
Analysis of the objectives’ achievement, according to the project assessment per-
spective, requires a clear logical reasoning. That is why in an empirical part of this 
article firstly, I will describe a point to which previous presidencies have brought the 
enlargement process. This will help to answer the first research question and will show 
how far the enlargement process has moved forward since July 2011 till June 2012. 
Then the objectives of each of the presidencies, concerning candidates countries, are 
going to be presented. A brief external and internal factor analysis, influencing the 
objectives’ accomplishment, will complete this part. Next I am going to describe, 
what each presidency has done to push forward accession negotiations. This concerns 
a way of proceeding in the Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating 
Accession to the EU, COREPER, the Council and the European Council. All forms 
of relations between presidencies and candidate countries, like meeting, conferences, 
signing of the documents will be also analyzed in the context of obtained results. At 
25 Idem, ‘Bargaining Power…’, pp. 697 -698.
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the end I will sum up whether the presidency has achieved its objectives and what was 
their character, according to the list of analytical categories of the project assessment 
perspective.
3.1. Presidency as a project in enlargement policy
Up to the 1 July 2011 there were five countries which had a candidate status, i.e. Croatia, 
Iceland, Turkey, Montenegro and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Beside 
there were four other countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and 
Serbia – which hadn’t gained a status of candidate to the EU because of the difficulties 
with fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria for the membership.
An important general guidelines, which had influenced the agenda of Polish,Danish 
and Cypriot presidencies, were adopted by the Council on 14 December 201026. They 
expressed expectations about the progress made by countries in the enlargement proc-
ess. In the case of Turkey the expectations regarded: further normalization of its re-
lations with the Republic of Cyprus; efforts to fully meet Copenhagen criteria27; 
respecting the sovereign rights of the EU Member States to enter into bilateral agree-
ments, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Council looked for-
ward to the further progress in the screening process of Iceland’s law and regulations. 
Hungarian presidency, as well as subsequent presidencies, supposed to work on open-
ing the accession negotiation with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. In case 
of Serbia the Council made conditional granting a candidate status on further coopera-
tion with International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and quick begin-
ning of dialogue with Kosovo authorities. The Council also stated that in the case of 
Montenegro opening of negotiations depended on positive opinion of the Commission 
based on fulfillment of the seven key priorities pointed out in Commission’s Opinion 
on Montenegro in enlargement strategy for the year 201028. Similarly, Albania should 
focused on fulfilling the twelve key priorities set out in Commission’s Opinion and 
overcome the political stalemate after the parliamentary election held at the end of June 
2010. The Council appealed to Bosnia and Herzegovina to introduce necessary re-
forms regarding functioning state institution, mainly through constitutional changes. 
26 ‘Press Release on Council Conclusions on Enlargement/Stabilisation and Association Process, 3060th 
General Affairs Council Meeting’, The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 14 December 2010, 
at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/118487.pdf>, 2 
October 2012.
27 In the Declaration of the European Council adopted on 21 -22 June 1993, member states  agreed 
that Central and Eastern European states which were at that time associated with the European 
Communities, had to fulfill three prerequisites: a) concerning democratic countries, i.e. achieving an 
institutional stability, rule of law, respecting human rights; b) having an efficient market economy able 
to cope with the competitiveness in the internal market of the European Communities; c) an ability to 
fulfill the obligations of the political, economy and monetary union.
28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Commission 
Opinion on Montenegro’s Application for Membership of the European Union, No. COM (2010) 67, 
The European Commission, Brussels, 9 November 2011, pp. 11 -12.
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Finally, in the case of Kosovo the Council’s expectations concerned a cooperation with 
EULEX and establishing a dialogue with Serbia.
More important for Polish, Danish and Cypriot presidencies were the European 
Council’s conclusions adopted on 23/24 June 2011 – just before the beginning of 
Polish presidency. Heads of states and governments called to close remaining negotia-
tion chapters and take all decisions necessary for concluding the accession negotiations 
with Croatia by the end of June 2011. Accession Treaty, according to the European 
Council recommendation, should have been signed by the end of 2011. Discussion on 
further steps of continuing the integration path for other Balkans state should have tak-
en place during the summit in December 2011. This event, according to the European 
Council, will bring “a momentum to the European perspective of the Western Balkans, 
provided these countries continue on the path of reform”29. In this context Serbia’s EU 
perspective was particularly mentioned after the arresting and transferring to Hague 
Serbian general Ratko Mladic, responsible for war crimes in the years 1992 -1995.
Croatia. In the first version of the Polish presidency objectives, a subject of conclud-
ing a negotiations with Croatia was omitted30. This issue eventually dropped in the of-
ficial six -month presidency program at the end of May 2011, when it became certain 
that Hungary would manage to finalize negotiation with this Balkan’s country31. Thus, 
Poland was obliged in the next half year to sign the Accession Treaty with Croatia.
The day before starting of the Polish presidency, on 30 June 2011, the thirteenth 
meeting of the Accession Conference with Croatia at Ministerial level was held. During 
the meeting last four negotiation chapters were closed, i.e.: Chapter 8 – Competition 
Policy, Chapter 23 – Judicial and Fundamental Rights, Chapter 33 – Financial and 
Budgetary Provisions, Chapter 35 – Other Issues. This moment was in fact the end of 
five years negotiation process started in October 200532.
Next steps undertook by the Polish presidency concerned preparation of the draft 
text of the Accession Treaty. On 13 September 2011 Permanent Representatives’ 
Committee received a note from General Secretariat, where it requested to approve the 
29 ‘European Council Conclusions’, 23/24 June 2011, The European Council, p. 12, at <http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/123075.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
30 ‘Wstępna lista priorytetów polskiego przewodnictwa w Radzie Unii Europejskiej w II połowie 2011 r.’, 
[trans.: ‘Preliminary list of the priorities of the Polish presidency In the Council of the European 
Union in the second half of 2011’]. This document was adopted by the Council of Ministers on 21 
July 2010. It contained six priorities: multiannual financial framework 2014 -2020, relations with 
Eastern Europe, internal market, enhancing external energy policy of the EU, common security and 
defense policy, taking advantage of the intellectual capital of Europe. Document available at <http://
www.premier.gov.pl/rzad/pozostale_dokumenty/informacje_zwiazane_z_ue/_wstepna_lista_prio-
rytetow_p,5071/>, 2 October 2012.
31 Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union. 1 July 2011 – 31 December 
2011, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Warsaw 2011.
32 ‘Press Release on Thirteenth Meeting of the Accession Conference with Croatia at Ministerial Level’, 
The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 30 June 2011, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/123336.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
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agreed draft text (technical level details) and to send it to the European Commission 
for consultation and to European Parliament in order to get a consent on acces-
sion of the Republic of Croatia33. COREPER approved the draft text next day and 
on 17 September 2011 in Zagreb the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, official-
ly handed over the EU Accession Treaty text to Croatian Prime Minister, Jadranka 
Kosor. A month later, on 12 October the European Commission has delivered favo-
rable avis definitive (a non binding primary opinion) on the accession of Croatia34 and 
European Parliament on 1 December adopted a resolution giving a consent for signing 
an Accession Treaty35. During the meeting of the European Council on 9 December 
2011 the document was signed by the heads of states or governments of the 27 member 
states, by Ivo Josipovic, the President of Croatia and the Croatian Prime Minister.
Polish presidency has fully accomplished one of its objectives in the field of en-
largement. Denmark, a forthcoming country holding the chair of the Council, com-
mitted itself to “(…) monitor the consolidation of Croatia and the continuation of the 
country’s reform efforts after the accession treaty was signed (…)”36. Similar objective 
had Cyprus presidency37. However, a presidency during the ratification process has 
no crucial competencies. In fact, a ratification of the Accession Treaty with Croatia 
in each member state is beyond any competencies of a presidency38. It is also a duty of 
the European Commission to assess the commitments undertaken by Croatia in the 
areas which need to be improved before joining the EU on 1 July 2013. The European 
Commission sends these monitoring reports every six months only as a communication 
33 ‘Treaty, Protocol and Act of Accession with the Republic of Croatia – Finalisation of the Drafting 
of the Treaty, Protocol and Act of Accession – Consultation of the Commission and Request for the 
European Parliament’s Consent to the Accession to the European Union of the Republic of Croatia 
– Political Agreement on the Adaptations Required by Reason of Accession’, General Secretariat of 
the Council of European Union, Brussels, 13 September 2011, Document No. 14003/11, at <http://
register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/11/st14/st14003.en11.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
34 ‘Commission Opinion on the Application for Accession to the European Union by the Republic of 
Croatia’, The European Commission, COM (2011) 667, Brussels, 12 October 2011, at <http://eur-
-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0667:FIN:EN:PDF>, 2 October 2012.
35 ‘European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 1 December 2011 on the Accession to the European 
Union of the Republic of Croatia’ (14409/2011 – C7 -0252/2011 – 2011/0805(NLE)), The European 
Parliament, Brussels, 1 December 2011, at <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRe-
f= -//EP//TEXT+TA+P7 -TA -2011 -0538+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>, 2 October 2012.
36 ‘Europe at Work. Programme of the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
2012. 1 January -20 June 2012’, p. 25, at <http://eu2012.dk/en/EU -and -the -Presidency/About -the-
-Presidency/~/media/Files/Trykt%20materiale/Presidency%20programme/EU%20Presidency_
Programme_UK_Final%20Web_22_12.pdf>, 24 August 2012.
37 “The Cyprus Presidency will follow closely the monitoring process for the implementation of the 
commitments assumed by Croatia during the accession negotiations, in view of the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Report to be presented by the European Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council in autumn 2012” in Programme of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
1 July – 31 December 2012, Cyprus EU Presidency Secretariat, 2012, pp. 10 -11.
38 So far (until 30 September 2012) only eleven Members States have ratified Croatia’s Accession 
Treaty – Slovakia, Hungary, Italy, Bulgaria, Malta, Latvia, Czech Republic, Lithuania, Cyprus, 
Romania, Austria.
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to the Council and European Parliament39. Thus, it is necessary to make a note, that al-
though Denmark and Cyprus decided to choose such an objective they had no formal 
competences to fulfil this task.
Iceland. Bringing negotiation with Iceland, as far as it is possible, has been a common ob-
jective for both presidencies. An accession process of Iceland seemed uncomplicated be-
cause of long lasting cooperation of this country with the European Communities (signing 
a free trade agreement in 1972) and later with the EU (joining European Economic Area 
in 1994), which favored adapting Icelandic law to the aquis communitare. An Iceland’s 
screening process under the Polish presidency was characterized by a significant dyna-
mism. Until the 1 July 2011 the Hungarian presidency had managed to accept 8 screening 
reports of an Icelandic law. During the six months of Polish presidency a Working Party 
on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU accepted 15 of those re-
ports and sent them to COREPER I or II as an information note40.
The negotiations with Iceland wasn’t very advanced before 1 July 2011. They 
stopped at the stage where four chapters, screened earlier by adequate working par-
ty, had been opened, i.e. Chapter 5 – Public Procurement, Chapter 10 – Information 
Society and Media, Chapter 25 – Science and Research and Chapter 26 – Education 
and Culture. Last two chapters had been also provisionally closed during the Accession 
Conference on 27 June 201141.
On 19 October 2011, the First meeting of the Accession Conference with Iceland at 
Deputy level was held in Brussels. During the meeting the EU delegation (led by repre-
sentative of Polish Presidency – Jan Tombiński, Poland’s Permanent Representative to the 
EU) and Icelandic delegation (led by Stefán H. Jóhannesson, Iceland’s Chief Negotiator 
to the EU) have opened and provisionally closed negotiations on Chapter 2 – Freedom 
of Movement for Workers and Chapter 7 – Intellectual Property Law42. Third meet-
39 ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Main Findings 
of the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Croatia’s State of Preparedness for EU Membership’, The 
European Commission, Brussels, 10 October 2012, COM (2012) 601 final, at <http://ec.europa.eu/
enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/package/hr_rapport_2012_en.pdf>, 10 January 2012.
40 The screening reports accepted by the Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating 
Accession to the EU was concerning following negotiation chapters: Chapter 33: Financial and bud-
getary provisions, Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights, Chapter 6: Company Law, Chapter 
29: Customs Union, Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial Policy, Chapter 22: Regional policy and 
coordination of structural instruments, Chapter 16: Taxation, Chapter 21: Trans -European networks, 
Chapter 31: Foreign, Security and Defence Policy, Chapter 19: Social Policy and Employment, 
Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy, Chapter 18: Statistics, Chapter 27: 
Environment, Chapter 15: Energy.
41 ‘Press Release on Second Meeting of the Accession Conference at Ministerial Level with Iceland. 
Opening of Accession Negotiations’, The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 27 June 2011, 
at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/123123.pdf>, 
2 October 2012.
42 ‘Press Release on First Meeting of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Deputy Level’, The 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 19 October 2011, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
media/1302274/125354.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
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ing of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Ministerial level (first was on 27 July 
2010; second one on 27 June 2011) and last during the Polish presidency was held on 
12 December 2011. In this meeting from the EU side took part Maciej Szpunar, Under-
-Secretary of State for legal and treaty affairs in Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Commissioner Štefan Füle, who was representing the European Commission. Iceland was 
represented by Össur Skarphéðinsson, Minister for Foreign Affairs and External Trade. 
During the IAC the delegations firstly confirmed results of the Accession Conference 
on 19 October and secondly, opened and provisionally closed four chapters (i.e. Chapter 
6 – Company Law, Chapter 20 – Enterprise and Industrial Policy, Chapter 21 – Trans-
-European Networks and Chapter 23 – Judiciary and Fundamental Rights). Only one 
opened chapter didn’t meet the benchmarks for provisional closure (i.e. Chapter 33 – 
Financial and Budgetary Provisions)43.
Under the Denmark’s chairmanship in the Council a pace of adopting the screen-
ing reports by the European Commission has slowed down. It echoed in the number 
reports adopted by the Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating 
Accession to the EU, which set at the level of 7. This was more than a half less compar-
ing to the Polish presidency, but this doesn’t diminish Denmark’s involvement.
In the first half of the year 2012 the Accession Conference gathered twice – on 
30 March and on 22 June 2012. During the first one, gathered at the deputy level, nego-
tiators have opened four chapters – i.e. Chapter 8 – Competition policy, Chapter 15 – 
Energy, Chapter 28 – Consumer and health protection, Chapter 31 – Foreign, security 
and defence policy – out of which last two were provisionally closed44. The Accession 
Conference in June 2012 was held at ministerial level, fourth of this kind in the his-
tory of Iceland’s accession negotiations. At this meeting the delegations opened three 
chapters: Chapter 14 – Transport Policy, Chapter 19 – Social Policy and Employment, 
Chapter 32 – Financial Control. None of them have been provisionally closed so far45.
In the second half of the year 2012 Cyprus presidency – according to its pro-
gramme – has planned to strive to bring the negotiations with Iceland as close as pos-
sible to its conclusion46. Similar to the period of Polish and Danish presidencies the 
Accession Conference met twice – one time on deputy level on 24 October and second 
time on ministerial level on 18 December. During the first meeting the negotiations 
have resulted in three opened chapters (Chapter 9 – Financial Services, Chapter 18 – 
Statistics, Chapter 29 – Customs Union). In December delegations led by Ministry of 
43 ‘Press Release on Third Meeting of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Ministerial Level’, The 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 12 December 2011, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/126778.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
44 ‘Second Meeting of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Deputy Level’, The Council of the 
European Union, Brussels, 30 March 2012, 8378/12 PRESSE 147, at <http://www.consilium.euro-
pa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/129376.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
45 ‘Accession Conference with Iceland. Three New Chapters Opened, Progress Confirmed’, The Council 
of the European Union, Brussels, 22 June 2012, 11767/12 PRESSE 286, at <http://europa.eu/rapid/
pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/12/286&type=HTML>, 2 October 2012.
46 Programme of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union…, p. 10.
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Foreign Affairs of Cyprus Mr. Erato Kozakou -Marcoullis and the Iceland Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and External Trade Össur Skarphéðinsson have managed to closed one 
chapter referring to competition policy and to start negotiating on Chapter 1 – Free 
Movement of Goods, Chapter 16 – Taxation, Chapter 17 – Economic and Monetary 
Policy, Chapter 22 – Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments, 
Chapter 27 – Environment, and Chapter 30 External Relations47.
Although Cyprus presidency opened nine chapters, which is most of all from the 
trio countries the pace of negotiation with Iceland is steadily slowing down. It is vis-
ible when analysing the number of screening reports, which have to be adopted by the 
COREPER before opening a given negotiation chapter. During Cyprus presidency 
Working Party on Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU pro-
ceeded on two of such documents, which is more than twice less than in the case of 
Danish presidency. Nevertheless, such a slowdown in the negotiation process is pre-
dictable. It is a common practice that candidate country strive to close in the first phase 
of the negotiations those chapters, which are the most convergent with the EU aquis 
and which don’t cause any objections of the European Commission.
Turkey. Since the opening of accession negotiation with Turkey on 3 October 2005 
very little progress was made in this subject. Out of 35 negotiating chapters, thirteen 
have been opened and one provisionally closed. Until the end of Belgian presidency in 
December 2010 no new chapter was closed48. On the 19 April 2011, the 49th EU – 
Turkey Association Council was held. Delegation of the EU represented by Hungarian 
presidency and Turkish delegation led by Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs reviewed 
EU -Turkey relations, the accession process and the implementation of the Association 
Agreement. On this occasion EU appreciated the constitutional reform package i.e. 
referendum on constitutional change carried out on 12 September 201049.
During the Polish presidency a negotiation process with Turkey hasn’t moved fur-
ther. In the communication from the European Commission of 12 October 2011 on 
the Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2011 -2012 a hitherto reformatory ef-
forts were appreciated. At the same time it was underlined that Turkey refused to re-
spect the obligation of maintaining good neighborhood relations and full implementa-
tion of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement, not discriminating other 
47 ‘Third Meeting of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Deputy Level’, The Council of the 
European Union, Brussels, 24 October 2012, 15371/12 PRESSE 444, at <http://www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/133154.pdf>, 10 January 2013; ‘Fifth Meeting 
of the Accession Conference with Iceland at Ministerial Level. Six New Chapters Opened, One More 
Chapter Provisionally Closed, Substantial Progress Achieved’, The Council of the European Union, 
Brussels, 18 December 2012, 17894/12 PRESSE 543, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/
cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/genaff/134419.pdf>, 10 January 2013.
48 J.J. Węc, ‘Ocena belgijskiej prezydencji w UE’, 19 May 2011, at <http://ec.europa.eu/polska/news/
opinie/110519_belgijska_prezydencja_pl.htm>, 18 September 2012.
49 ‘Press Release on 49th EU -Turkey Association Council’, The Council of the European Union, 
Brussels, 19 April 2011, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/
er/121603.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
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Member States. As the European Commission underlined, until the progress is made in 
mentioned areas the negotiations wouldn’t accelerate50. Additional worries were raised 
after Turkey stated that it would freeze its relations with the EU presidency during the 
second half of 2012, when Cyprus is going to hold this post. Despite these obstacles, 
the European Commission in an enlargement strategy proposed a new positive agen-
da with Turkey, which should support negotiation process, covering inter alia politi-
cal reforms, foreign policy dialogue, visas, migration, energy, the fight against terror-
ism and participation in the EU programs51. On 5 December 2011 the General Affairs 
Council in its conclusions reiterated opinions and requirements from the European 
Commission’s enlargement strategy for the years 2011 -201252, which were eventually 
recalled by the European Council in its conclusions four days later53.
Denmark among its objectives declared to support a continuation of the negotia-
tions with Turkey. Similarly to the Polish presidency period, in the first half of the year 
2012 the EU and Turkey didn’t made any progress in opening or closing new chap-
ters. Danish presidency planned also to support the development of relations between 
Turkey and the EU. In this field the presidency was more successful.
Few days before the end of the Danish presidency – on 26 June 2012 – the Council 
adopted a decision allowing to put a signature on behalf of the EU under the Agreement 
between the UE and Turkey on the readmission of people residing without authoriza-
tion54. On its basis Turkey will undertake additional measures to prevent illegal migrants 
fleeing to Greece or Bulgaria. This, as Turkey’s officials predict, will help their country to 
join the EU visa -free area in two -three years55. Also substitution of Nicolas Sarkozy, who 
opposed Turkey’s membership, by Francois Hollande at the post of a France’s president is 
expected to break stalemate in the accession negotiations lasting since June 2010.
Although a strategy of positive agenda in accession negotiations with Turkey was 
confirmed during Danish presidency56 there was high probability on the eve of Cyprus 
50 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2011 -2012, COM (2011) 666, The European Commission, Brussels, 
12 October 2011, pp. 25 -26.
51 Ibid., p. 19.
52 ‘Press Release 3132nd Council meeting General Affairs’, No. 18089/11, The Council of the European 
Union, Brussels, 5 December 2011, pp. 13 -16, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_
Data/docs/pressData/EN/genaff/126578.pdf>, 2 October 2012.
53 Conclusion of the European Council, Brussels, 9 December 2011, EUCO 139/1/11 REV, p. 4.
54 Council Decision of 26 June 2012 on the Signing, on Behalf of the European Union, of the Agreement be-
tween the European Union and the Republic of Turkey on the Readmission of Persons Residing without 
Authorisation (2012/499/EU), Official Journal of the EU, L 244/4.
55 ‘Turkey Hopes for EU Visa Breakthrough this Week’, EUObserver, 19 June 2012, at <http://euob-
server.com/enlargement/116678>, 2 October 2012.
56 A positive agenda in EU -Turkey accession process was launched on 17 May 2012 in Ankara. Its aim is 
to strengthen the efforts to implement reforms in Turkey in areas, which are in common interest both 
for EU and Turkey. This process should involve not only politicians and officials but also broader ca-
talogue of civil society groups and organizations. During EU -Turkey Association Council on 22 June 
2012 Danish presidency expressed its hope that accession negotiations will be continue in accord-
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presidency that no issues concerning enlargement process will occur in relation between 
this country and Turkey. Cyprus during its presidency made any progress in accession 
negotiations with Turkey dependant on fulfilling the guidelines of Turkey’s Negotiating 
Framework and relevant Council conclusions, which generally demanded normaliza-
tion of the relations between Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey’s declaration 
on freezing relations with Cyprus presidency, expressed in the mid of 2011, and harsh 
negotiation between representatives of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, held in 
January 2012 under the auspices of the United Nations on solving the problem of is-
land division, made a situation more tense even before the Cyprus began its presiden-
cy57. From the one side the EU tried to present its commitment to the accession process. 
The European Commission in its annually Progress Report on Enlargement appreciat-
ed all reformatory efforts in Turkey, calling simultaneously to fulfill the political mem-
bership criteria58. From the other side however there was a visible critique of Turkey’s 
policy towards Republic of Cyprus, which was explicite enclosed in the General Affairs 
Council conclusions from December 201259. This ambiguous position was eventually 
criticized by Turkish Ministry of EU Affairs as “(…) subjective, biased, unwarranted 
and bigoted attitudes (…)” in their own report referring to the progress made by this 
country in the EU accession process60.
Montenegro. On 16/17 December 2010 the European Council agreed to give Montenegro 
the status of candidate country. However, few days before the summit, on 14 December 
2010, as it was mentioned at the beginning of this section, ministers of foreign or European 
affairs of member states agreed that the opening of negotiations with Montenegro is de-
pendent on positive opinion of the European Commission. In the Enlargement Strategy 
2011 -2012 the European Commission confirmed that Montenegro had fulfilled the pri-
orities set out in 2010 and it is ready to open the accession negotiations61.
ance to the new framework, see: EU -Turkey Association Council, The Council of the European Union, 
Brussels, 22 June 2012, 11776/12 PRESSE 287, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_
data/docs/pressdata/en/er/131131.pdf>, 10 January 2013.
57 ‘Turkey Warns of Freezing Ties with Cyprus EU Presidency’, Euractive.com, 14 July 2011, at <http://
www.euractiv.com/enlargement/turkey -warns -freezing -ties -cypru -news -506534>, 1 October 2012; 
‘Cyprus Deal Sought by Mid -Summer’, Euractive.com, 24 January 2012, at <http://www.euractiv.
com/enlargement/cyprus -deal -sought -mid -summer -news -510344>, 1 October 2012.
58 Commission Staff Working Document. Turkey 2012 Progress Report Accompanying the Document 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council – Enlargement 
Strategy and Main Challenges 2012 -2013, European Commission, Brussels, 10.10.2012 SWD (2012) 
336 final.
59 Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process – Council Conclusions, The Council of the 
European Union, Brussels, 11 December 2012, 17604/12, pp. 8 -13, at <http://register.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/pdf/en/12/st17/st17604.en12.pdf>, 10 January 2013.
60 ‘Turkey Accuses EU of Bigotry’, Euractive.com, 2 January 2013, at <http://www.euractiv.com/enlarge-
ment/turkey -accuses -eu -bigotry -news -516832>, 10 January 2013.
61 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement 
Strategy…, pp. 26 -27.
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During the Polish presidency in the Council one technical issue was pushed fur-
ther in EU – Montenegro relations. At the end of October 2011 a draft Cooperation 
Agreement between European Police College (CEPOL) and the Police Academy in 
Danilovgrad in the Republic of Montenegro was processed by COREPER 62. This fact 
is important in the context of enlargement policy because representative of a country 
holding the presidency chairs also the Governing Board of the CEPOL. Thus, the pres-
idency has an instrument of influence on some issues referring the cooperation with 
other countries in the field of police’s education.
The European Council in its conclusions on 9 December 2011 appreciated a progress 
made by Montenegro. It called the Council to examine implementation of reforms 
in Montenegro, particularly in the areas of rule of law and fundamental rights, fight 
against corruption and organized crime. This should be done on the basis of a report, 
which the European Commission supposed to present in the first half of 2012. As the 
European Council stated, a perspective of opening the negotiation with Montenegro 
was June 201263.
In the Commission’s report presented in May 2012 it stated that Montenegro has 
reached a necessary level of compliance with Copenhagen political criteria and provid-
ed that this country will make further progress in implementing reforms the European 
Commission recommended the Council to open accession negotiations64. According 
to this statement General Affairs Council on 26 June 2012 adopted the EU general 
negotiation position, setting a framework for talks with Montenegro, and referred to 
the European Council to open negotiations on 29 June 201265. On this day, at the end 
of Danish presidency, first Accession Conference with Montenegro at ministerial level 
has been held. What is worth noticing, beside recommendation for Montenegro to 
stay on reform track, is that delegations haven’t opened any negotiation chapter66. It 
was done however six months later on 19 December 2012 during the second Accession 
Conference at ministerial level, when EU and Montenegro delegations have opened 
and provisionally closed Chapter 25 – Science and Research. In the second half of the 
year 2012 the Cyprus presidency at the level of working party accepted two screening 
62 ‘Item Note from the General Secretariat to the COREPER/Council on Cooperation Agreement be-
tween CEPOL and the Police Academy in Danilovgrad, Republic of Montenegro’, No. 15449/1, The 
Council of the European Union, Brussels, 24 October 2011, at <http://register.consilium.europa.eu/
pdf/en/11/st15/st15449.en11.pdf>, 30 September 2012.
63 Conclusion of the European Council, Brussels, 9 December 2011, p. 5.
64 ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Montenegro’s Progress 
in the Implementation of Reforms’, The European Commission, Brussels, 22 May 2012, COM (2012) 
222 final, at <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2012/montenegro_spring_re-
port_en.pdf>, 30 September 2012.
65 ‘Press Release 3180th Council meeting General Affairs’, 11690/12, The Council of the European 
Union Luxembourg, 26 June 2012, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/
pressdata/EN/genaff/131236.pdf>, 30 September 2012.
66 ‘Press Release. First Accession Conference with Montenegro’, Brussels, 12033/12, The Council of the 
European Union, 29 June 2012, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/press-
data/en/er/131410.pdf>, 30 September 2012.
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reports referring to the judiciary, fundamental rights and justice, freedom and security. 
On the basis of those two facts the presidency objective stating that Cyprus is willing 
to” (…) implement swiftly the Union’s decision to open accession negotiations with 
Montenegro and to contribute to the decisive advancement of these negotiations”67 can 
be marked as accomplished.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Although the European Commission 
recommended opening accession negotiation with Macedonia as early as in the 2009 
Enlargement Package, the Council has not yet decided on it. The European Commission 
in its Enlargement Strategy 2011 -2012 has reiterated a recommendation to move to 
the second stage of transitional period as provided in the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreement and open accession negotiations68. In the conclusions of the General Affairs 
Council on 5 December 2011, it generally agreed on the European Commission’s opin-
ion to start the negotiation with Macedonia and expressed its readiness to return to 
this issue during the next presidency69. Nevertheless, it is not an overstatement that 
Macedonia’s European perspective wasn’t at the top list of Polish presidency priorities. 
Firstly, although Poland literally declared in its objectives “to support the European 
aspirations of the whole region of Western Balkans”70, it didn’t distinguished any sin-
gle state from this part of the continent. This meant that activity of Polish presiden-
cy was rather directed towards another issue, namely Eastern Partnership. Secondly, 
Poland’s involvement in the EU -Western Balkans relations during the presidency didn’t 
go beyond officially planned meetings, i.e. organising Western Balkan EU Ministerial 
Forum in October 2011 or meeting with the ministers from candidate countries on the 
occasion of informal ministerial meeting of the Member States. Bearing in mind above 
restrictions, the way the presidency’s objective was phrased tends to admit that it was 
accomplished.
Denmark didn’t include a accession negotiations with Macedonia into its enlarge-
ment objectives list, though the General Affairs Council had declared on 5 December 
2011 a readiness to return to opening of the negotiations with Macedonia during 
the next presidency71. However, Danish representative attended in the Stabilization 
and Association Council regular meetings, reviewing a developments in aligning 
Macedonian regulation to the political and economic criteria of accession process72.
67 Programme of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union…, p. 10.
68 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Enlargement 
Strategy…, pp. 26.
69 ‘Komunikat prasowy z 3132. posiedzenia Rady do Spraw Ogólnych…’, p. 18.
70 Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union…, pp. 11 -12.
71 Europe at work. Programme of the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2012…, 
pp. 24 -25.
72 ‘Joint Press Release. Eighth Meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the EU’, 1453/12, The Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
23 January 2012, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/1398834/127481.pdf>, 1 October 
2012; ‘Joint Press Release. Ninth Meeting of the Stabilisation and Association Council between 
117POLITEJA 1(23)/2013 Effectiveness of the Polish…
The status of negotiation process with Macedonia didn’t change during Denmark 
and Cyprus presidency. Remarkable in this context is that similarly to Denmark, 
among Cypriot objectives we can’t find those concerning Macedonia accession to the 
EU73. One of possible obstacle for moving this issue forward is the conflict between 
Macedonia and Greece on the legal name of the first country. Greece government states 
that term “Macedonia” belongs to the historical area, which lies nowadays in the bor-
der of the Hellenic Republic. Thus, a Greek speaking part of Cyprus, which belongs to 
the EU won’t probably oppose a position of its partner, with whom has not only strong 
cultural bonds, but also economic ones74. Although during the regular meetings un-
der the Stabilisation and Association Council Framework, where the reform process 
of economic and political adjustment to the EU aquis was examined, a so called ‘name 
issue’ was visibly present in Council conclusion. General Affairs Council, chaired by 
the Cyprus Foreign Minister, stated on 11 December that it is crucial to work on good 
neighbourhood relations and to bring “(…) a longstanding discussions on the name is-
sue to a definitive conclusion without delay”75.
Serbia. At the end it is necessary to notice that on 12 October 2011 the European 
Commission gave its opinion on Serbia’s application for membership of the European 
Union. Bearing in mind that this country generally fulfilled the Copenhagen po-
litical criteria and requirements imposed in the framework of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process the European Commission recommended the Council to grant 
Serbia the status of candidate country76. The European Council in December 2011 
called the Council to examine whether Serbia is still committed to the regional dia-
logue, has reached an agreement on inclusive regional cooperation and is cooperating 
with EULEX and KFOR77. On the basis of this assessment the Council recommended 
the European Council on 28 February 2012 to grant Serbia candidate status, which it 
has eventually done on 1 March78. Nevertheless Danish presidency didn’t move on with 
this issue.
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the EU’, 12873/12, The Council of the European 
Union, Brussels, 24 July 2012, at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressda-
ta/EN/foraff/132003.pdf>, 1 October 2012.
73 Programme of the Cyprus Presidency of the Council of the European Union…, pp. 10 -11.
74 Ł. Fleischerowicz, ‘Macedonia w NATO i UE a nowy rząd grecki i przewodnictwo Cypru w Radzie 
UE’, balkanistyka.org, 14 lipca 2012, at <http://balkanistyka.org/wp/macedonia -w -nato -i -ue -a-
-nowy -rzad -grecki -i -przewodnictwo -cypru -w -radzie -ue/>, 1 October 2012; on the problematic re-
lations between Macedonia and Greece in the context of NATO enlargement in the Balkans see: 
T. Żornaczuk, ‘Wyzwania procesu rozszerzenia NATO na Bałkanach’, Biuletyn Polskiego Instytutu 
Spraw Międzynarodowych, No. 65 (930), 5 July 2012.
75 ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process – Council Conclusions’, p. 19.
76 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Commission 
Opinion on Serbia’s Application for Membership of the European Union, No. COM (2011) 668 final, 
The European Commission, Brussels, 12 October 2011, p. 12.
77 Conclusion of the European Council, Brussels, 9 December 2011, p. 5.
78 Conclusion of the European Council, Brussels, 1 -2 March 2012, EUCO 4/3/12 REV 3, p. 14.
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Cypriot presidency in one of its objectives has focused on Serbia accession per-
spective, aiming potentially decision for the opening of accession negotiations by 
the European Council. Strong commitment of Cyprus to maintain priority re-
lations with Western Balkans states was visible as on 11 June 2012 the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis made his first foreign visit during 
Cypriot presidency to Serbia. During this visit, which started tour de capital in 
Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania, E. Kozakou-Marcoullis said 
that presidency will put an effort in order to open accession negotiations with 
Serbia in December 2012, provided that the European Commission would made 
positive recommendation on that issue79. In spite of such declaration there was no 
progress in this matter. In its conclusion on 11 December 2012 the Council has 
stated that Serbia needs to stay on the path of fulfilling necessary political criteria 
and conditions outlined by the Stabilisation and Association Process. The Council 
has declared to examine a progress in mentioned issues no sooner than in Spring 
2013. It is however dependant on positive decision of the European Council on 
opening the negotiations and after the Commission and European Union High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will have presented their re-
port on reform process in Serbia80.
4. CONCLUSIONS ON TRIO PRESIDENCY EFFECTIvENESS 
IN THE FIELD OF ENLARGEMENT POLICY
In order to clearly illustrate to what degree each presidency has fulfilled its objectives 
I will present an accomplishment level on a three -step scale (see table 1).
Table 1. A level of Polish and Danish objectives’ accomplishment in the field of enlargement policy.
Objective Accom-plished
Partially 
acommplished
Not 
accomplished
PO
LA
N
D
To sign the Accession Treaty with Croatia X
To explore all opportunities to continue ac-
cession negotiation with Turkey X
A meaningful progress made in accession ne-
gotiation with Iceland X
To support the European aspirations of the 
Western Balkans X
79 ‘Press Release – The Cyprus Presidency supports enlargement in the Western Balkans’, Cyprus 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union Official Website, 11 July 2012, at <http://www.
cy2012.eu/en/news/press -release–the -cyprus -presidency -supports -enlargement -in -the -western-
-balkans>, 1 October 2012.
80 ‘Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process – Council Conclusions’, p. 22.
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Objective Accom-plished
Partially 
acommplished
Not 
accomplished
D
EN
M
A
R
K
Taking further forward the enlargement ne-
gotiations with Iceland X
To support a continuation of the enlargement 
negotiations with Turkey and the development 
of relations between Turkey and the EU.
X
To discuss and, potentially, decide on further 
steps to be taken with respect to the approxi-
mation of Serbia and Montenegro (European 
Council conclusion on December 2011)
X
To monitor the consolidation of Croatia and 
the continuation of the country’s reform ef-
forts after the accession treaty was signed 
with Croatia on 9 December 2011.
X
Objective Accom-plished
Partially 
acommplished
Not 
accomplished
C
Y
PR
U
S
To contribute in taking forward Iceland’s ac-
cession negotiations, aiming at bringing the 
process as close as possible to its conclusion
X
To reinforce Turkey’s accession prospect, 
which is of critical importance and to fo-
cus on advancing this prospect, in line with 
Turkey’s Negotiating Framework and rele-
vant Council conclusions.
X
To implement swiftly the Union’s deci-
sion to open accession negotiations with 
Montenegro and to contribute to the decisi-
ve advancement of these negotiations.
X
To seek to build on the momentum created 
by European Council Decision to grant 
candidate status to Serbia, a key country in 
the Western Balkans, aiming potentially to 
a European Council decision for the opening 
of accession negotiations.
X
To follow closely the monitoring process for 
the implementation of the commitments as-
sumed by Croatia during the accession ne-
gotiations, in view of the Comprehensive 
Monitoring Report to be presented by the 
European Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council in autumn 2012.
X
Source: Prepared by author on a basis of: Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union. 1 July 2011 – 31 December 2011…, p. 12; ‘Europe at Work. Programme of the Danish Presidency of 
the Council of the European Union 2012. 1 January -20 June 2012…’, pp. 24 -25; Programme of the Cyprus 
Presidency of the Council of the European Union…, p. 10 -11.
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In case of Poland as well as Denmark accomplished objectives are the majority. 
This means that officials, who prepared the agendas fit in the legislative plans of the 
European Commission and working agenda of other EU institutions. The reason why 
the rest objectives weren’t fully accomplished is that the actions undertaken by trio 
didn’t correspond with the content of the objectives, which were planned long before 
each presidency started.
Only Poland has managed to accomplish its presidency’s objective regarding the ac-
cession of Croatia. An argument for marking Danish and Cypriot objectives on Croatia 
as not accomplished is that those countries didn’t undertake any actions, which were 
supposed to directly monitor reforms in Croatia. In fact it lies only in competencies of 
the European Commission to regularly present an effect of such monitoring. An ex-
ample for this was a report on Croatia’s accession preparations published in April and 
October 2012.
In the area of negotiation with Iceland all three countries fully accomplished their 
objectives. However, a point to which they moved this process was different. During 
the Polish presidency seven new negotiation chapters were open, out of which six were 
closed. Danish presidency opened the same number of chapters as Poland, but man-
aged to close only two of them. The biggest progress in opening new chapters has made 
Cyprus presidency whereas it has managed to close only one.
Poland and Denmark accomplished their objectives, which referred to the Turkey. 
During the Polish presidency the General Affairs Council reiterated opinion and de-
mands from the European Commission’s Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 
2011 -2012. Although this statement was not an own initiative of the presidency, it ful-
fills the objective formulated by Poland. Danish objective was more precise. It was also 
accomplished by the fact, that the Council adopted in June 2012 a decision allowing to 
put a signature on behalf of the EU under the Agreement between the UE and Turkey 
on the readmission of people residing without authorization. Only Cyprus hasn’t ac-
complished its objective on Turkey. It has made any progress in this issue dependant 
on fulfilling Negotiating Framework and relevant Council conclusions but presidency 
has also stated that it will focus on advancing the Turkey’s accession perspective. In this 
matter however, there was no prospect on positive actions or declaration undertaken by 
either Cyprus presidency or Turkey government.
The Polish presidency’s objective concerning Western Balkans was partially accom-
plished. A way of formulation of this objective suggested a presidency’s involvement 
would go beyond technical issues (like in the case of Montenegro) and officially planed 
meetings (like Western Balkan EU Ministerial Forum in October 2011). On this basis 
it is hard to classify this objective either as fully accomplished or completely not accom-
plished. Danish presidency’s objective was again more precise because it referred only to 
Serbia and Montenegro, not generally to the whole region. Thus, this objective was ac-
complished thanks to granting Serbia a candidate status in March 2012 and starting the 
accession negotiation with Montenegro on 29 June 2012. Cyprus objective on Serbia 
was partially accomplished. The presidency contributed to the General Affairs Council 
conclusions, where it has enclosed some prospects for moving negotiation forward. 
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Nevertheless, Cyprus in its objective counted on pushing the process further by using 
the fact of granting the candidate status to Serbia. Presidency has made this dependant 
however on the European Council decision for the opening of accession negotiations.
Assessment of the types of the objectives and through that also a character of each 
presidency’s activity is more straightforward. All objectives chosen by trio presidencies 
are continuity objectives. It is a rare situation, when in the field of enlargement policy 
appears a new objective, which presidency rises for the first time. However, an objec-
tive concerning relations with Macedonia has a potential to be an innovative in the fu-
ture. It is because in the programme of a current trio, as well as in programme of each 
presidency, topic concerning Macedonia was omitted or generalized by referring to 
the Western Balkan region. This is opposite to the programmes of Spain, Belgian and 
Hungary presidencies, from previous trio, where Macedonia’s case was clearly present.
All accomplished, partially accomplished and not accomplished objectives can be 
characterized also as firm ones. However, it is significant that before presidencies start-
ed, all objectives were formulated, as if they were soft. In this way presidencies usually 
try to avoid an unpredictable situation, which doesn’t depend on them, but which can 
disrupt fulfilling the objectives. All of them resulted eventually in opening new chap-
ters, signing agreement (for example an Agreement between the UE and Turkey on the 
readmission of people residing without authorization) or at least adopting the Council 
conclusion. There was only one exception, which from the beginning was a firm objec-
tive, namely issue referring to the signing the Accession Treaty with Croatia.
Also all objectives have to be characterized as agreed. A reason for this is firstly, 
enlargement policy in an area where all presidencies’ actions are consulted with the 
European Commission. Secondly, enlargement as an ongoing issue in the EU agen-
da has to be consulted among trio countries. A framework for executing a continuity 
rule is a group presidency programme. This doesn’t mean that every agreed objective is 
equally important. We can distinguish those on which presidencies put more emphasis 
than on others. In case of Polish presidency it was signing the Accession Treaty with 
Croatia. Poland tried to quickly prepared a draft text of this document and achieved 
positive opinion of the European Commission and the EP, thanks to which the treaty 
has been signed in December 2011. For Denmark and Cyprus an important objec-
tives referred to Serbia and Montenegro. Although in a trio programme states that an 
attention will be paid to the Western Balkan, Danish and Cyprus presidencies have 
chosen only those countries, where a chance for a success was bigger than in the case of 
Macedonia negotiations.
A continuation character of objectives and thanks to that also character of trio pres-
idencies shows, that all three countries agreed on current enlargement policy’s guide-
lines and directions. They both were in favour of further EU enlargement (with some 
restrictions towards singular countries) and didn’t have ambitions to revise this policy’s 
framework.
Trio presidencies will be also remembered because of the facts such as signing the 
Accession Treaty with Croatia, granting Serbia a candidate status and opening acces-
sion negotiations with Montenegro. Objectives referring to those matters provided 
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firm aftermath of both presidencies. Their agreed character shows also the great im-
portance three presidencies attached to them. A proof of the presidencies’ ambitions to 
leave a visible effect of own work are inter alia 23 newly opened negotiations chapters 
with Iceland, out of which 9 were provisionally closed.
On the basis of above analysis and objectives’ characteristic we can objectively assess 
that activities of the presidencies contributed to the advancement of the enlargement 
process. As a political issue, however, there were visible differentiations in relations 
with candidate countries. Despite the fact that all objectives were agreed, at least in 
the framework of trio 18 -month programme, each presidency put more or less stronger 
emphasis on their own preferences. The most visible example was Turkey issue during 
Cyprus presidency.
Nevertheless, trio presidencies have managed to push the enlargement process fur-
ther in other, also important for the EU, areas. First of all a significant progress was 
made in the negotiations with Iceland. An important step was also done in the rela-
tions with Serbia and Montenegro. However it is hard to predict, when first country 
will manage to open negotiations. As it was concluded previously, objectives of all trio 
presidencies weren’t ambitious and rather focused on continuation of current princi-
ples of enlargement policy. Despite such objectives’ character Poland, Denmark and 
Cyprus were able to leave a visible aftermath of their activities, what author inter alia 
sought to be proved in this analysis.
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